The ouster of Sheikh Hasina in August 2024 and the installation of the caretaker government under Muhammad Yunus created space for Dhaka to recalibrate its foreign policy. Pakistan seized this opportunity with high-level political, diplomatic, economic, and cultural engagements. Multiple ministerial visits, business delegations, and eased visa restrictions reflected a conscious effort to rebuild ties frozen under Hasina’s tenure.
The visit produced several agreements and initiatives:
However, there was no progress on unresolved issues of 1971, including apology, stranded Pakistanis, and division of assets.
Bangladeshis continue to demand an unconditional apology for atrocities committed by the Pakistan Army. Dar’s claim that the matter was “settled” in 1974 and under Musharraf drew strong rebuttals from Bangladeshi officials and media. Public opinion in Bangladesh still views Pakistan’s reluctance to formally acknowledge responsibility as an obstacle to genuine reconciliation.
Dar met not only government leaders but also delegations from BNP, Jamaat-e-Islami, and the National Citizen Party. These parties historically maintained a pro-Pakistan and anti-India orientation. Such outreach signals Islamabad’s intent to revive older linkages and strengthen political constituencies within Bangladesh sympathetic to its positions.
Bilateral trade rose from US$ 628 million in 2023–24 to US$ 865 million in 2024–25. Pakistan’s exports to Bangladesh increased by 28%, while Bangladesh’s exports to Pakistan grew by 20%. Both sides are exploring youth linkages, connectivity, and business collaboration. Economic interdependence is being promoted as the foundation for a lasting partnership.
Strategic Concerns: India had been Bangladesh’s closest partner under Hasina, with strong security and economic cooperation. Dhaka’s growing warmth with Pakistan raises concerns in New Delhi about losing strategic depth in its neighborhood.
Security Implications: Pakistan’s renewed links with BNP and Jamaat, parties accused of allowing cross-border terrorism in the past, could revive old security anxieties for India.
Regional Balance: If Dhaka tilts toward Islamabad, India may face a less cooperative neighbor in South Asia, complicating its regional leadership ambitions.
Both Pakistan and Bangladesh are partners in the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). China’s investments in infrastructure, connectivity, and energy in both countries could facilitate greater Dhaka–Islamabad cooperation. Some in Pakistan envision a trilateral Pakistan–Bangladesh–China alignment, which would reduce India’s influence in South Asia. Beijing benefits by drawing both countries into its strategic orbit while counterbalancing India.
SAARC Revival: Both sides discussed rejuvenating SAARC, signaling interest in regionalism without India’s dominance.
New Groupings: If Pakistan, Bangladesh, and China deepen cooperation, it could fragment South Asian unity further.
Geopolitical Reconfiguration: A warming Dhaka–Islamabad axis, with Chinese support, may create new blocs that dilute India’s centrality in South Asian geopolitics.
While trade, scholarships, and cultural diplomacy suggest momentum, the unresolved legacy of 1971 and strong Bangladeshi public opinion on justice remain structural hurdles. Unless Islamabad addresses these demands, bilateral relations may remain warm at the elite level but uneasy at the societal level.
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