The phrase “no-limits” was first used in a joint declaration in early 2022, just before Russia invaded Ukraine. It signaled an ambitious vision of unrestricted cooperation across trade, energy, and diplomacy. In practice, however, the partnership remains bounded by political realities, historical mistrust, and competing strategic interests.
China has become Russia’s largest trading partner, accounting for more than half of Moscow’s imports. Around 50% of Russia’s crude oil exports now go to China, providing vital revenue as Western sanctions take their toll. Yet the relationship is asymmetric. Russia is not among China’s top five trading partners, and Russian oil makes up only about 17–18% of China’s total imports. This imbalance highlights Russia’s growing dependence on Beijing, while China retains far greater flexibility.
Despite its stronger position, Beijing avoids exploiting Moscow’s vulnerability because:
• It values stability and fears pushing Russia into unpredictable actions.
• Non-interference is a cornerstone of China’s foreign policy.
• Access to discounted Russian energy is strategically valuable.
• Pressuring Russia could weaken a partnership that helps counter Western influence.
The Ukraine war is a mixed picture for Beijing. On one hand, it ties down US and NATO resources in Europe, which indirectly eases strategic pressure in the Indo-Pacific. On the other, China has little influence over how the war unfolds. Beijing has deliberately kept its role limited, presenting itself as a neutral “peacemaker”, while leaving active mediation to countries like Turkey and Saudi Arabia.
Suspicion runs deep in the relationship due to:
• Russia’s seizure of 1.5 million square kilometers of Chinese territory in the 19th century.
• The 1969 Sino-Soviet border clashes, which nearly escalated into full-scale war.
• A broader Chinese perception that close ties with Moscow are an exception, not the historical norm.
Fault lines in the partnership include:
• Energy pricing: Russia resists China’s push for lower gas prices in Power of Siberia 2 negotiations.
• Trade disputes: Moscow imposed “recycling fees” on Chinese cars to curb import surges.
• Territorial anxiety: Russian nationalists fear Chinese influence in Siberia and the Far East.
• Arctic politics: Russia remains cautious of China’s push to label itself a “near-Arctic state.”
• North Korea: Moscow’s growing support for Pyongyang undermines Beijing’s leverage over Kim Jong-un.
China has been pushing deeper into Central Asia, a region long dominated by Moscow. In 2023 alone, Beijing pledged more than $25 billion in investments, and Xi Jinping’s participation in the China–Central Asia Summit signaled its determination to expand in Russia’s traditional sphere of influence.
Russia’s closer ties with North Korea, including food and fuel assistance, complicate Beijing’s position. For China, instability on the Korean Peninsula is a direct security risk, making Pyongyang a potential wedge issue in its partnership with Moscow.
While Moscow publicly emphasizes its partnership with Beijing, it resists being seen as a junior partner. The Kremlin views itself as a global power, and many Russian elites argue for strategic independence—even if that means enduring economic isolation.
The Xi–Putin relationship is transactional and strategic rather than ideological. Economic and energy ties are likely to remain strong, but historical grievances, political mistrust, and diverging global ambitions prevent the formation of a true alliance. For Beijing, a collapsing Russia would be destabilizing, but fully tying China’s future to Moscow would also be a risky bet.
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